Trademarks and Trade Secrets
Trademarks and Trade Secrets
Source identification, use, distinctiveness, priority, registration, likelihood of confusion, dilution, false advertising, functionality, defenses, secrecy, value, reasonable measures, acquisition, misappropriation, and records. Firewall doctrine: render structure, refuse interpretation, cite, abstain, and hand off.
Structured Visual
Jurisdiction: US; as of 2026-08-28; not legal advice; Render structure, refuse interpretation, cite, abstain, and hand off.
RENDER STRUCTURE · REFUSE INTERPRETATION · CITE · ABSTAIN · HAND-OFF: render structure, refuse interpretation, cite provenance, abstain when unsupported, and hand off to human review.
Scope and honesty note
Jurisdiction: United States federal IP, privacy, consumer-data, and cybersecurity overview as of 2026-08-29; state, international, sectoral, contractual, factual, procedural, remedial, and version differences matter. Synthetic records are classroom inputs, not legal, licensing, infringement, registration, patentability, trademark, trade-secret, privacy, HIPAA, consumer-reporting, security, incident-response, criminal, health, identity or compliance advice. The model cannot determine ownership, protection, validity, infringement, fair use, obviousness, confusion, secrecy, license compatibility, consent, authorization, breach, liability, reporting, access, eligibility or outcome. Cite, expose gaps, abstain, and hand off.
See the essential structure first
Start with this deliberately incomplete structure, then use the pinned authorities, worked application, exceptions, and handoff below. This deliberately incomplete preview has 4 nodes; exceptions and legal consequences remain in the sourced prose below.
Jurisdiction: US; as of 2026-08-28; not legal advice; Render structure, refuse interpretation, cite, abstain, and hand off.
RENDER STRUCTURE · REFUSE INTERPRETATION · CITE · ABSTAIN · HAND-OFF: render structure, refuse interpretation, cite provenance, abstain when unsupported, and hand off to human review.
Begin with IP, privacy, or security doctrine
Trademark protects source identification and goodwill, not words or product features in the abstract. Rights depend on use, priority, distinctiveness, goods or services, territory and likelihood of confusion; registration adds important benefits but does not make confusion automatic. Functional features are not protected as trademarks. Trade-secret protection requires information deriving independent economic value from not being generally known or readily ascertainable and reasonable measures to maintain secrecy. It lasts only while secrecy persists and does not bar independent development, proper acquisition or lawful reverse engineering. Trademark confusion factors and secrecy measures are evidence, not scores.
Principal-register limits
The provision pins registration eligibility and refusal categories, including confusion, descriptiveness, functionality and acquired-distinctiveness branches. Verbatim source text: “§ 1052. Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless it— Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute; or a geographical indication which, when used on or in connection with wines or spirits, identifies a place other than the origin of the goods and is first used on or in connection with wines or spirits by the applicant on or after one year after the date on which the WTO Agreement (as defined in section 3501(9) of title 19 ) enters into force with respect to the United States. Consists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of the United States, or of any State or municipality, or of any foreign nation, or any simulation thereof. Consists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent, or the name, signature, or portrait of a deceased President of the United States during the life of his widow, if any, except by the written consent of the widow. Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive: Provided , That if the Director determines that confusion, mistake, or deception is not likely to result from the continued use by more than one person of the same or similar marks under conditions and limitations as to the mode or place of use of the marks or the goods on or in connection with which such marks are used, concurrent registrations may be issued to such persons when they have become entitled to use such marks as a result of their concurrent lawful use in commerce prior to (1) the earliest of the filing dates of the applications pending or of any registration issued under this chapter; (2) July 5, 1947 , in the case of registrations previously issued under the Act of March 3, 1881 , or February 20, 1905 , and continuing in full force and effect on that date; or (3) July 5, 1947 , in the case of applications filed under the Act of February 20, 1905 , and registered after July 5, 1947 . Use prior to the filing date of any pending application or a registration shall not be required when the owner of such application or registration consents to the grant of a concurrent registration to the applicant. Concurrent registrations may also be issued by the Director when a court of competent jurisdiction has finally determined that more than one person is entitled to use the same or similar marks in commerce. In issuing concurrent registrations, the Director shall prescribe conditions and limitations as to the mode or place of use of the mark or the goods on or in connection with which such mark is registered to the respective persons. Consists of a mark which (1) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, (2) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically descriptive of them, except as indications of regional origin may be registrable under section 1054 of this title , (3) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive of them, (4) is primarily merely a surname, or (5) comprises any matter that, as a whole, is functional. Except as expressly excluded in subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), (e)(3), and (e)(5) of this section, nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce. The Director may accept as prima facie evidence that the mark has become distinctive, as used on or in connection with the applicant’s goods in commerce, proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a mark by the applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on which the claim of distinctiveness is made. Nothing in this section shall prevent the registration of a mark which, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive of them, and which became distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce before December 8, 1993 . A mark which would be likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under section 1125(c) of this title , may be refused registration only pursuant to a proceeding brought under section 1063 of this title . A registration for a mark which would be likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under section 1125(c) of this title , may be canceled pursuant to a proceeding brought under either section 1064 of this title or section 1092 of this title . July 5, 1946, ch. 540 60 Stat. 428 Pub. L. 87–772, § 2 Oct. 9, 1962 76 Stat. 769 Pub. L. 93–596, § 1 Jan. 2, 1975 88 Stat. 1949 Pub. L. 100–667, title I, § 104 Nov. 16, 1988 102 Stat. 3937 Pub. L. 103–182, title III, § 333(a) Dec. 8, 1993 107 Stat. 2114 Pub. L. 103–465, title V, § 522 Dec. 8, 1994 108 Stat. 4982 Pub. L. 105–330, title II, § 201(a)(2) Oct. 30, 1998 112 Stat. 3069 Pub. L. 106–43, § 2(a) Aug. 5, 1999 113 Stat. 218 Pub. L. 106–113, div. B, § 1000(a)(9) [title IV, § 4732(b)(1)(B)] Nov. 29, 1999 113 Stat. 1536 Pub. L. 109–312, § 3(a) Oct. 6, 2006 120 Stat. 1732 Editorial Notes Acts March 3, 1881 , and February 20, 1905 , referred to in subsec. (d), are acts Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138 , 21 Stat. 502 , and Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592 , 33 Stat. 724 , which were repealed insofar as inconsistent with this chapter by act July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(a) , 60 Stat. 444 . Act Feb. 20, 1905 , was classified to sections 81 to 109 of this title. For information regarding the constitutionality of certain provisions of this section, see the Table of Laws Held Unconstitutional in Whole or in Part by the Supreme Court on the Constitution Annotated website, constitution.congress.gov. Acts Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 5 , 33 Stat. 725 ; Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2573, § 1 , 34 Stat. 1251 ; Feb. 18, 1911, ch. 113 , 36 Stat. 918 ; Jan. 8, 1913, ch. 7 , 37 Stat. 649 ; Mar. 19, 1920, ch. 104, § 9 , 41 Stat. 535 ; June 7, 1924, ch. 341 , 43 Stat. 647 . 2006— Pub. L. 109–312 , which directed substitution of “A mark which would be likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under section 1125(c) of this title , may be refused registration only pursuant to a proceeding brought under section 1063 of this title . A registration for a mark which would be likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under section 1125(c) of this title , may be canceled pursuant to a proceeding brought under either section 1064 of this title or section 1092 of this title .” for last two sentences in subsec. (f) of this section, was executed by making the substitution for “A mark which when used would cause dilution under section 1125(c) of this title may be refused registration only pursuant to a proceeding brought under section 1063 of this title . A registration for a mark which when used would cause dilution under section 1125(c) of this title may be canceled pursuant to a proceeding brought under either section 1064 of this title or section 1092 of this title .” in concluding provisions of section to reflect the probable intent of Congress. 1999— Pub. L. 106–43 inserted concluding provisions. Subsecs. (d), (f). Pub. L. 106–113 substituted “Director” for “Commissioner” wherever appearing. 1998— Pub. L. 105–330, § 201(a)(12) , substituted “trademark” for “trade-mark” in introductory provisions. Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 105–330, § 201(a)(2)(A) , struck out “or” before “(4)” and inserted “, or (5) comprises any matter that, as a whole, is functional” before period at end. Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 105–330, § 201(a)(2)(B) , substituted “subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), (e)(3), and (e)(5)” for “paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e)(3)”. 1994—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 103–465 amended subsec. (a) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (a) read as follows: “Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.” 1993—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 103–182, § 333(a)(1) , amended subsec. (e) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (e) read as follows: “Consists of a mark which, (1) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, or (2) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, except as indications of regional origin may be registrable under section 1054 of this title , or (3) is primarily merely a surname.” Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 103–182, § 333(a)(2) , substituted “(d), and (e)(3)” for “and (d)” and inserted at end “Nothing in this section shall prevent the registration of a mark which, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive of them, and which became distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce before December 8, 1993 .” 1988—Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 100–667, § 104(1) , amended subsec. (d) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (d) read as follows: “Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when applied to the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive: Provided , That when the Commissioner determines that confusion, mistake, or deception is not likely to result from the continued use by more than one person of the same or similar marks under conditions and limitations as to the mode or place of use of the marks or the goods in connection with which such marks are used, concurrent registrations may be issued to such persons when they have become entitled to use such marks as a result of their concurrent lawful use in commerce prior to (i) the earliest of the filing dates of the applications pending or of any registration issued under this chapter; or (ii) July 5, 1947 , in the case of registrations previously issued under the Act of March 3, 1881 , or February 20, 1905 , and continuing in full force and effect on that date; or (iii) July 5, 1947 , in the case of applications filed under the Act of February 20, 1905 , and registered after July 5, 1947 . Concurrent registrations may also be issued by the Commissioner when a court of competent jurisdiction has finally determined that more than one person is entitled to use the same or similar marks in commerce. In issuing concurrent registrations, the Commissioner shall prescribe conditions and limitations as to the mode or place of use of the mark or the goods in connection with which such mark is registered to the respective persons.” Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 100–667, § 104(2) , substituted “used on or in connection with” for “applied to” in two places. Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 100–667, § 104(3) , substituted “used on or in connection with” for “applied to” and “five years before the date on which the claim of distinctiveness is made” for “five years next preceding the date of the filing of the application for its registration” 1975—Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 93–596 substituted “Patent and Trademark Office” for “Patent Office”. 1962—Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 87–772 , among other changes, substituted provisions authorizing the issuance of concurrent registrations to persons when they have become entitled to use such marks as a result of their concurrent lawful use in commerce prior to the earliest of the filing dates of the applications pending or of any registration issued under this chapter, or July 5, 1947 , in the case of registrations previously issued under the act of Mar. 3, 1881 , or Feb. 20, 1905 , and continuing in full force and effect on that date, or July 5, 1947 , in the case of applications under the act of Feb. 20, 1905 , and registered after July 5, 1947 , for provisions which restricted issuance of concurrent registrations to persons entitled to use such mark as a result of their concurrent lawful use thereof in commerce prior to any of the filing dates of the applications involved, and provisions directing that issuance of the mark be upon such conditions and limitations as to the mode or place of use of the marks or the goods in connection with which such marks are used, for provisions which required issuance under conditions and limitations as to the mode or place of use of the goods in connection with which such registrations may be granted, and eliminated provisions which limited confusion, mistake, or deception to purchasers, required written notice of applications for concurrent registrations and of hearings thereon, and publication in the Official Gazette upon a decision to grant such a registration and permitted a court to order such a registration under section 4915 of the Revised Statutes. Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries Amendment by Pub. L. 106–113 effective 4 months after Nov. 29, 1999 , see section 1000(a)(9) [title IV, § 4731] of Pub. L. 106–113 , set out as a note under section 1 of Title 35 , Patents. Pub. L. 106–43, § 2(e) , Aug. 5, 1999 , 113 Stat. 218 , provided that: “The amendments made by this section [amending this section and sections 1063, 1064, and 1092 of this title] shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act [ Aug. 5, 1999 ] and shall apply only to any application for registration filed on or after January 16, 1996 .” Amendment by Pub. L. 105–330 effective Oct. 30, 1998 , and applicable only to any civil action filed or proceeding before the United States Patent and Trademark Office commenced on or after such date relating to the registration of a mark, see section 201(b) of Pub. L. 105–330 , set out as a note under section 1051 of this title . Pub. L. 103–465, title V, § 523 , Dec. 8, 1994 , 108 Stat. 4982 , provided that: “The amendments made by this subtitle [subtitle B (§§ 521–523) of title V of Pub. L. 103–465 , amending this section and section 1127 of this title ] take effect one year after the date on which the WTO Agreement enters into force with respect to the United States [ Jan. 1, 1995 ].” Pub. L. 103–182, title III, § 335 , Dec. 8, 1993 , 107 Stat. 2116 , which provided that the amendments made: (1) by sections 332, 334, and 335 of Pub. L. 103–182 took effect on the date NAFTA entered into force with respect to the United States ( Jan. 1, 1994 ); (2) by section 331 of Pub. L. 103–182 applied to patent applications filed on or after Dec. 8, 1993 ; and (3) by section 333 of Pub. L. 103–182 applied only to trademark applications filed on or after Dec. 8, 1993 , was repealed by Pub. L. 116–113, title VI, § 601 , Jan. 29, 2020 , 134 Stat. 78 , effective on the date the USMCA entered into force ( July 1, 2020 ). Amendment by Pub. L. 100–667 effective one year after Nov. 16, 1988 , see section 136 of Pub. L. 100–667 , set out as a note under section 1051 of this title . Amendment by Pub. L. 93–596 effective Jan. 2, 1975 , see section 4 of Pub. L. 93–596 , set out as a note under section 1111 of this title . Repeal of inconsistent provisions, effect of this chapter on pending proceedings and existing registrations and rights under prior acts, see notes set out under section 1051 of this title . Marks registered under the “ten-year proviso” of section 5 of the act of Feb. 20, 1905 , as amended, deemed to have become distinctive of the registrant’s goods in commerce under par. (f) of this section, see section 46(b) of act July 5, 1946 , set out in note under section 1051 of this title . Executive Documents For transfer of functions of other officers, employees, and agencies of Department of Commerce to Secretary of Commerce, with certain exceptions, see Reorg. Plan No. 5 of 1950, §§ 1, 2, eff. May 24, 1950 , 15 F.R. 3174, 64 Stat. 1263 , set out in the Appendix to Title 5, Government Organization and Employees. The Uruguay Round Agreements, including the World Trade Organization Agreement and agreements annexed to that Agreement, as referred to in section 3511(d) of Title 19 , Customs Duties, entered into force with respect to the United States on Jan. 1, 1995 . See note set out under section 3511 of Title 19 .” Source: 15 U.S.C. § 1052; https://www.neochart.com/catalog/federal/title_15/section_1052/title15_sec1052_2c28b50e87e0/1052_trademarks_registrable_on_principal_register_concurrent_0001/index.html; data via neochart.com, snapshot 2026-08.
False designation and dilution
The provision pins use in commerce, likely confusion, false or misleading descriptions, advertising injury and dilution branches. Verbatim source text: “§ 1125. False designations of origin, false descriptions, and dilution forbidden (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which— (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. (2) As used in this subsection, the term “any person” includes any State, instrumentality of a State or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity. (3) In a civil action for trade dress infringement under this chapter for trade dress not registered on the principal register, the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional. Any goods marked or labeled in contravention of the provisions of this section shall not be imported into the United States or admitted to entry at any customhouse of the United States. The owner, importer, or consignee of goods refused entry at any customhouse under this section may have any recourse by protest or appeal that is given under the customs revenue laws or may have the remedy given by this chapter in cases involving goods refused entry or seized. (1) Injunctive relief Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any time after the owner’s mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury. (2) Definitions (A) For purposes of paragraph (1), a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner. In determining whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the following: (i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties. (ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark. (iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark. (iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881 , or the Act of February 20, 1905 , or on the principal register. (B) For purposes of paragraph (1), “dilution by blurring” is association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark. In determining whether a mark or trade name is likely to cause dilution by blurring, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the following: (i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark. (ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark. (iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark. (iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark. (v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an association with the famous mark. (vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous mark. (C) For purposes of paragraph (1), “dilution by tarnishment” is association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark. (3) Exclusions The following shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this subsection: (A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or services, including use in connection with— (i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare goods or services; or (ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner. (B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary. (C) Any noncommercial use of a mark. (4) Burden of proof In a civil action for trade dress dilution under this chapter for trade dress not registered on the principal register, the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that— (A) the claimed trade dress, taken as a whole, is not functional and is famous; and (B) if the claimed trade dress includes any mark or marks registered on the principal register, the unregistered matter, taken as a whole, is famous separate and apart from any fame of such registered marks. (5) Additional remedies In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous mark shall be entitled to injunctive relief as set forth in section 1116 of this title . The owner of the famous mark shall also be entitled to the remedies set forth in sections 1117(a) and 1118 of this title, subject to the discretion of the court and the principles of equity if— (A) the mark or trade name that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment was first used in commerce by the person against whom the injunction is sought after October 6, 2006 ; and (B) in a claim arising under this subsection— (i) by reason of dilution by blurring, the person against whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the recognition of the famous mark; or (ii) by reason of dilution by tarnishment, the person against whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to harm the reputation of the famous mark. (6) Ownership of valid registration a complete bar to action The ownership by a person of a valid registration under the Act of March 3, 1881 , or the Act of February 20, 1905 , or on the principal register under this chapter shall be a complete bar to an action against that person, with respect to that mark, that— (A) is brought by another person under the common law or a statute of a State; and (B) (i) seeks to prevent dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment; or (ii) asserts any claim of actual or likely damage or harm to the distinctiveness or reputation of a mark, label, or form of advertisement. (7) Savings clause Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to impair, modify, or supersede the applicability of the patent laws of the United States. (1) (A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this section, if, without regard to the goods or services of the parties, that person— (i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this section; and (ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that— (I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark; (II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that mark; or (III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section 706 of title 18 or section 220506 of title 36 . (B) (i) In determining whether a person has a bad faith intent described under subparagraph (A), a court may consider factors such as, but not limited to— (I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if any, in the domain name; (II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that person; (III) the person’s prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or services; (IV) the person’s bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site accessible under the domain name; (V) the person’s intent to divert consumers from the mark owner’s online location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site; (VI) the person’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods or services, or the person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; (VII) the person’s provision of material and misleading false contact information when applying for the registration of the domain name, the person’s intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or the person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; (VIII) the person’s registration or acquisition of multiple domain names which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others that are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the time of registration of such domain names, without regard to the goods or services of the parties; and (IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person’s domain name registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning of subsection (c). (ii) Bad faith intent described under subparagraph (A) shall not be found in any case in which the court determines that the person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful. (C) In any civil action involving the registration, trafficking, or use of a domain name under this paragraph, a court may order the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark. (D) A person shall be liable for using a domain name under subparagraph (A) only if that person is the domain name registrant or that registrant’s authorized licensee. (E) As used in this paragraph, the term “traffics in” refers to transactions that include, but are not limited to, sales, purchases, loans, pledges, licenses, exchanges of currency, and any other transfer for consideration or receipt in exchange for consideration. (2) (A) The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a domain name in the judicial district in which the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located if— (i) the domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or protected under subsection (a) or (c); and (ii) the court finds that the owner— (I) is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person who would have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1); or (II) through due diligence was not able to find a person who would have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1) by— (aa) sending a notice of the alleged violation and intent to proceed under this paragraph to the registrant of the domain name at the postal and e-mail address provided by the registrant to the registrar; and (bb) publishing notice of the action as the court may direct promptly after filing the action. (B) The actions under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall constitute service of process. (C) In an in rem action under this paragraph, a domain name shall be deemed to have its situs in the judicial district in which— (i) the domain name registrar, registry, or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located; or (ii) documents sufficient to establish control and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use of the domain name are deposited with the court. (D) (i) The remedies in an in rem action under this paragraph shall be limited to a court order for the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark. Upon receipt of written notification of a filed, stamped copy of a complaint filed by the owner of a mark in a United States district court under this paragraph, the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority shall— (I) expeditiously deposit with the court documents sufficient to establish the court’s control and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use of the domain name to the court; and (II) not transfer, suspend, or otherwise modify the domain name during the pendency of the action, except upon order of the court. (ii) The domain name registrar or registry or other domain name authority shall not be liable for injunctive or monetary relief under this paragraph except in the case of bad faith or reckless disregard, which includes a willful failure to comply with any such court order. (3) The civil action established under paragraph (1) and the in rem action established under paragraph (2), and any remedy available under either such action, shall be in addition to any other civil action or remedy otherwise applicable. (4) The in rem jurisdiction established under paragraph (2) shall be in addition to any other jurisdiction that otherwise exists, whether in rem or in personam. July 5, 1946, ch. 540 60 Stat. 441 Pub. L. 100–667, title I, § 132 Nov. 16, 1988 102 Stat. 3946 Pub. L. 102–542, § 3(c) Oct. 27, 1992 106 Stat. 3568 Pub. L. 104–98, § 3(a) Jan. 16, 1996 109 Stat. 985 Pub. L. 106–43 Aug. 5, 1999 113 Stat. 219 Pub. L. 106–113, div. B, § 1000(a)(9) [title III, § 3002(a)] Nov. 29, 1999 113 Stat. 1536 Pub. L. 109–312, § 2 Oct. 6, 2006 120 Stat. 1730 Pub. L. 112–190, § 1(a) Oct. 5, 2012 126 Stat. 1436 Editorial Notes Acts March 3, 1881 , and February 20, 1905 , referred to in subsec. (c)(2)(A)(iv), (6), are acts Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138 , 21 Stat. 502 , and Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592 , 33 Stat. 724 , which were repealed insofar as inconsistent with this chapter by act July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(a) , 60 Stat. 444 . Act Feb. 20, 1905 , was classified to sections 81 to 109 of this title. For information regarding the constitutionality of this section, see the Table of Laws Held Unconstitutional in Whole or in Part by the Supreme Court on the Constitution Annotated website, constitution.congress.gov. Act Mar. 19, 1920, ch. 104, § 3 , 41 Stat. 534 . 2012—Subsec. (c)(6). Pub. L. 112–190 added subpars. (A) and (B) and struck out former subpars. (A) and (B) which read as follows: “(A)(i) is brought by another person under the common law or a statute of a State; and “(ii) seeks to prevent dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment; or “(B) asserts any claim of actual or likely damage or harm to the distinctiveness or reputation of a mark, label, or form of advertisement.” 2006—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 109–312, § 2(1) , added subsec. (c) and struck out former subsec. (c) which related to remedies for dilution of famous marks. Subsec. (d)(1)(B)(i)(IX). Pub. L. 109–312, § 2(2) , substituted “subsection (c)” for “subsection (c)(1)”. 1999—Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 106–43, § 5 , added par. (3). Subsec. (c)(2). Pub. L. 106–43, § 3(a)(2) , inserted “as set forth in section 1116 of this title ” after “relief” in first sentence. Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 106–113 added subsec. (d). 1996—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 104–98 added subsec. (c). 1992—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 102–542 designated existing provisions as par. (1), redesignated former pars. (1) and (2) as subpars. (A) and (B), respectively, and added par. (2). 1988—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 100–667 amended subsec. (a) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (a) read as follows: “Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin or description or representation cause or procure the same to be transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.” Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries Pub. L. 112–190, § 1(b) , Oct. 5, 2012 , 126 Stat. 1436 , provided that: “The amendment made by subsection (a) [amending this section] shall apply to any action commenced on or after the date of the enactment of this Act [ Oct. 5, 2012 ].” Amendment by Pub. L. 106–113 applicable to all domain names registered before, on, or after Nov. 29, 1999 , see section 1000(a)(9) [title III, § 3010] of Pub. L. 106–113 , set out as a note under section 1117 of this title . Pub. L. 104–98, § 5 , Jan. 16, 1996 , 109 Stat. 987 , provided that: “This Act [amending this section and section 1127 of this title and enacting provisions set out as a note under section 1051 of this title ] and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act [ Jan. 16, 1996 ].” Amendment by Pub. L. 102–542 effective with respect to violations that occur on or after Oct. 27, 1992 , see section 4 of Pub. L. 102–542 , set out as a note under section 1114 of this title . Amendment by Pub. L. 100–667 effective one year after Nov. 16, 1988 , see section 136 of Pub. L. 100–667 , set out as a note under section 1051 of this title . Repeal of inconsistent provisions, effect of this chapter on pending proceedings and existing registrations and rights under prior acts, see notes set out under section 1051 of this title . Pub. L. 106–113, div. B, § 1000(a)(9) [title III, § 3006] , Nov. 29, 1999 , 113 Stat. 1536 , 1501A–550, provided that: “(a) In General .— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [ Nov. 29, 1999 ], the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Patent and Trademark Office and the Federal Election Commission, shall conduct a study and report to Congress with recommendations on guidelines and procedures for resolving disputes involving the registration or use by a person of a domain name that includes the personal name of another person, in whole or in part, or a name confusingly similar thereto, including consideration of and recommendations for— “(1) protecting personal names from registration by another person as a second level domain name for purposes of selling or otherwise transferring such domain name to such other person or any third party for financial gain; “(2) protecting individuals from bad faith uses of their personal names as second level domain names by others with malicious intent to harm the reputation of the individual or the goodwill associated with that individual’s name; “(3) protecting consumers from the registration and use of domain names that include personal names in the second level domain in manners which are intended or are likely to confuse or deceive the public as to the affiliation, connection, or association of the domain name registrant, or a site accessible under the domain name, with such other person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of the goods, services, or commercial activities of the domain name registrant; “(4) protecting the public from registration of domain names that include the personal names of government officials, official candidates, and potential official candidates for Federal, State, or local political office in the United States, and the use of such domain names in a manner that disrupts the electoral process or the public’s ability to access accurate and reliable information regarding such individuals; “(5) existing remedies, whether under State law or otherwise, and the extent to which such remedies are sufficient to address the considerations described in paragraphs (1) through (4); and “(6) the guidelines, procedures, and policies of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers and the extent to which they address the considerations described in paragraphs (1) through (4). “(b) Guidelines and Procedures .— The Secretary of Commerce shall, under its Memorandum of Understanding with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, collaborate to develop guidelines and procedures for resolving disputes involving the registration or use by a person of a domain name that includes the personal name of another person, in whole or in part, or a name confusingly similar thereto.”” Source: 15 U.S.C. § 1125; https://www.neochart.com/catalog/federal/title_15/section_1125/title15_sec1125_08901a74b924/1125_false_designations_of_origin_false_descriptions_and_dil_0001/index.html; data via neochart.com, snapshot 2026-08.
Unfair-practice coordinate
FTC Act text supplies a separate unfair or deceptive practice framework that does not replace trademark or trade-secret elements. Verbatim source text: “§45. Unfair methods of competition unlawful; prevention by Commission (a) Declaration of unlawfulness; power to prohibit unfair practices; inapplicability to foreign trade (1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful. (2) The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks, savings and loan institutions described in section 57a(f)(3) of this title, Federal credit unions described in section 57a(f)(4) of this title, common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce, air carriers and foreign air carriers subject to part A of subtitle VII of title 49, and persons, partnerships, or corporations insofar as they are subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, as amended [7 U.S.C. 181 et seq.], except as provided in section 406(b) of said Act [7 U.S.C. 227(b)], from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce. (3) This subsection shall not apply to unfair methods of competition involving commerce with foreign nations (other than import commerce) unless- (A) such methods of competition have a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect- (i) on commerce which is not commerce with foreign nations, or on import commerce with foreign nations; or (ii) on export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such commerce in the United States; and (B) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of this subsection, other than this paragraph. If this subsection applies to such methods of competition only because of the operation of subparagraph (A)(ii), this subsection shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in the United States. (4)(A) For purposes of subsection (a), the term "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" includes such acts or practices involving foreign commerce that- (i) cause or are likely to cause reasonably foreseeable injury within the United States; or (ii) involve material conduct occurring within the United States. (B) All remedies available to the Commission with respect to unfair and deceptive acts or practices shall be available for acts and practices described in this paragraph, including restitution to domestic or foreign victims. (b) Proceeding by Commission; modifying and setting aside orders Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any such person, partnership, or corporation has been or is using any unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce, and if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public, it shall issue and serve upon such person, partnership, or corporation a complaint stating its charges in that respect and containing a notice of a hearing upon a day and at a place therein fixed at least thirty days after the service of said complaint. The person, partnership, or corporation so complained of shall have the right to appear at the place and time so fixed and show cause why an order should not be entered by the Commission requiring such person, partnership, or corporation to cease and desist from the violation of the law so charged in said complaint. Any person, partnership, or corporation may make application, and upon good cause shown may be allowed by the Commission to intervene and appear in said proceeding by counsel or in person. The testimony in any such proceeding shall be reduced to writing and filed in the office of the Commission. If upon such hearing the Commission shall be of the opinion that the method of competition or the act or practice in question is prohibited by this subchapter, it shall make a report in writing in which it shall state its findings as to the facts and shall issue and cause to be served on such person, partnership, or corporation an order requiring such person, partnership, or corporation to cease and desist from using such method of competition or such act or practice. Until the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for review, if no such petition has been duly filed within such time, or, if a petition for review has been filed within such time then until the record in the proceeding has been filed in a court of appeals of the United States, as hereinafter provided, the Commission may at any time, upon such notice and in such manner as it shall deem proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any report or any order made or issued by it under this section. After the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for review, if no such petition has been duly filed within such time, the Commission may at any time, after notice and opportunity for hearing, reopen and alter, modify, or set aside, in whole or in part any report or order made or issued by it under this section, whenever in the opinion of the Commission conditions of fact or of law have so changed as to require such action or if the public interest shall so require, except that (1) the said person, partnership, or corporation may, within sixty days after service upon him or it of said report or order entered after such a reopening, obtain a review thereof in the appropriate court of appeals of the United States, in the manner provided in subsection (c) of this section; and (2) in the case of an order, the Commission shall reopen any such order to consider whether such order (including any affirmative relief provision contained in such order) should be altered, modified, or set aside, in whole or in part, if the person, partnership, or corporation involved files a request with the Commission which makes a satisfactory showing that changed conditions of law or fact require such order to be altered, modified, or set aside, in whole or in part. The Commission shall determine whether to alter, modify, or set aside any order of the Commission in response to a request made by a person, partnership, or corporation under paragraph 1 (2) not later than 120 days after the date of the filing of such request. (c) Review of order; rehearing Any person, partnership, or corporation required by an order of the Commission to cease and desist from using any method of competition or act or practice may obtain a review of such order in the court of appeals of the United States, within any circuit where the method of competition or the act or practice in question was used or where such person, partnership, or corporation resides or carries on business, by filing in the court, within sixty days from the date of the service of such order, a written petition praying that the order of the Commission be set aside. A copy of such petition shall be forthwith transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Commission, and thereupon the Commission shall file in the court the record in the proceeding, as provided in section 2112 of title 28. Upon such filing of the petition the court shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question determined therein concurrently with the Commission until the filing of the record and shall have power to make and enter a decree affirming, modifying, or setting aside the order of the Commission, and enforcing the same to the extent that such order is affirmed and to issue such writs as are ancillary to its jurisdiction or are necessary in its judgement to prevent injury to the public or to competitors pendente lite. The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive. To the extent that the order of the Commission is affirmed, the court shall thereupon issue its own order commanding obedience to the terms of such order of the Commission. If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence, and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the proceeding before the Commission, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Commission and to be adduced upon the hearing in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as to the court may seem proper. The Commission may modify its findings as to the facts, or make new findings, by reason of the additional evidence so taken, and it shall file such modified or new findings, which, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive, and its recommendation, if any, for the modification or setting aside of its original order, with the return of such additional evidence. The judgment and decree of the court shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court upon certiorari, as provided in section 1254 of title 28. (d) Jurisdiction of court Upon the filing of the record with it the jurisdiction of the court of appeals of the United States to affirm, enforce, modify, or set aside orders of the Commission shall be exclusive. (e) Exemption from liability No order of the Commission or judgement of court to enforce the same shall in anywise relieve or absolve any person, partnership, or corporation from any liability under the Antitrust Acts. (f) Service of complaints, orders and other processes; return Complaints, orders, and other processes of the Commission under this section may be served by anyone duly authorized by the Commission, either (a) by delivering a copy thereof to the person to be served, or to a member of the partnership to be served, or the president, secretary, or other executive officer or a director of the corporation to be served; or (b) by leaving a copy thereof at the residence or the principal office or place of business of such person, partnership, or corporation; or (c) by mailing a copy thereof by registered mail or by certified mail addressed to such person, partnership, or corporation at his or its residence or principal office or place of business. The verified return by the person so serving said complaint, order, or other process setting forth the manner of said service shall be proof of the same, and the return post office receipt for said complaint, order, or other process mailed by registered mail or by certified mail as aforesaid shall be proof of the service of the same. (g) Finality of order An order of the Commission to cease and desist shall become final- (1) Upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for review, if no such petition has been duly filed within such time; but the Commission may thereafter modify or set aside its order to the extent provided in the last sentence of subsection (b). (2) Except as to any order provision subject to paragraph (4), upon the sixtieth day after such order is served, if a petition for review has been duly filed; except that any such order may be stayed, in whole or in part and subject to such conditions as may be appropriate, by- (A) the Commission; (B) an appropriate court of appeals of the United States, if (i) a petition for review of such order is pending in such court, and (ii) an application for such a stay was previously submitted to the Commission and the Commission, within the 30-day period beginning on the date the application was received by the Commission, either denied the application or did not grant or deny the application; or (C) the Supreme Court, if an applicable petition for certiorari is pending. (3) For purposes of subsection (m)(1)(B) and of section 57b(a)(2) of this title, if a petition for review of the order of the Commission has been filed- (A) upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for certiorari, if the order of the Commission has been affirmed or the petition for review has been dismissed by the court of appeals and no petition for certiorari has been duly filed; (B) upon the denial of a petition for certiorari, if the order of the Commission has been affirmed or the petition for review has been dismissed by the court of appeals; or (C) upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of issuance of a mandate of the Supreme Court directing that the order of the Commission be affirmed or the petition for review be dismissed. (4) In the case of an order provision requiring a person, partnership, or corporation to divest itself of stock, other share capital, or assets, if a petition for review of such order of the Commission has been filed- (A) upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for certiorari, if the order of the Commission has been affirmed or the petition for review has been dismissed by the court of appeals and no petition for certiorari has been duly filed; (B) upon the denial of a petition for certiorari, if the order of the Commission has been affirmed or the petition for review has been dismissed by the court of appeals; or (C) upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of issuance of a mandate of the Supreme Court directing that the order of the Commission be affirmed or the petition for review be dismissed. (h) Modification or setting aside of order by Supreme Court If the Supreme Court directs that the order of the Commission be modified or set aside, the order of the Commission rendered in accordance with the mandate of the Supreme Court shall become final upon the expiration of thirty days from the time it was rendered, unless within such thirty days either party has instituted proceedings to have such order corrected to accord with the mandate, in which event the order of the Commission shall become final when so corrected. (i) Modification or setting aside of order by Court of Appeals If the order of the Commission is modified or set aside by the court of appeals, and if (1) the time allowed for filing a petition for certiorari has expired and no such petition has been duly filed, or (2) the petition for certiorari has been denied, or (3) the decision of the court has been affirmed by the Supreme Court, then the order of the Commission rendered in accordance with the mandate of the court of appeals shall become final on the expiration of thirty days from the time such order of the Commission was rendered, unless within such thirty days either party has instituted proceedings to have such order corrected so that it will accord with the mandate, in which event the order of the Commission shall become final when so corrected. (j) Rehearing upon order or remand If the Supreme Court orders a rehearing; or if the case is remanded by the court of appeals to the Commission for a rehearing, and if (1) the time allowed for filing a petition for certiorari has expired, and no such petition has been duly filed, or (2) the petition for certiorari has been denied, or (3) the decision of the court has been affirmed by the Supreme Court, then the order of the Commission rendered upon such rehearing shall become final in the same manner as though no prior order of the Commission had been rendered. (k) "Mandate" defined As used in this section the term "mandate", in case a mandate has been recalled prior to the expiration of thirty days from the date of issuance thereof, means the final mandate. (l) Penalty for violation of order; injunctions and other appropriate equitable relief Any person, partnership, or corporation who violates an order of the Commission after it has become final, and while such order is in effect, shall forfeit and pay to the United States a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation, which shall accrue to the United States and may be recovered in a civil action brought by the Attorney General of the United States. Each separate violation of such an order shall be a separate offense, except that in a case of a violation through continuing failure to obey or neglect to obey a final order of the Commission, each day of continuance of such failure or neglect shall be deemed a separate offense. In such actions, the United States district courts are empowered to grant mandatory injunctions and such other and further equitable relief as they deem appropriate in the enforcement of such final orders of the Commission. (m) Civil actions for recovery of penalties for knowing violations of rules and cease and desist orders respecting unfair or deceptive acts or practices; jurisdiction; maximum amount of penalties; continuing violations; de novo determinations; compromise or settlement procedure (1)(A) The Commission may commence a civil action to recover a civil penalty in a district court of the United States against any person, partnership, or corporation which violates any rule under this subchapter respecting unfair or deceptive acts or practices (other than an interpretive rule or a rule violation of which the Commission has provided is not an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of subsection (a)(1)) with actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances that such act is unfair or deceptive and is prohibited by such rule. In such action, such person, partnership, or corporation shall be liable for a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation. (B) If the Commission determines in a proceeding under subsection (b) that any act or practice is unfair or deceptive, and issues a final cease and desist order, other than a consent order, with respect to such act or practice, then the Commission may commence a civil action to obtain a civil penalty in a district court of the United States against any person, partnership, or corporation which engages in such act or practice- (1) after such cease and desist order becomes final (whether or not such person, partnership, or corporation was subject to such cease and desist order), and (2) with actual knowledge that such act or practice is unfair or deceptive and is unlawful under subsection (a)(1) of this section. In such action, such person, partnership, or corporation shall be liable for a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation. (C) In the case of a violation through continuing failure to comply with a rule or with subsection (a)(1), each day of continuance of such failure shall be treated as a separate violation, for purposes of subparagraphs (A) and (B). In determining the amount of such a civil penalty, the court shall take into account the degree of culpability, any history of prior such conduct, ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do business, and such other matters as justice may require. (2) If the cease and desist order establishing that the act or practice is unfair or deceptive was not issued against the defendant in a civil penalty action under paragraph (1)(B) the issues of fact in such action against such defendant shall be tried de novo. Upon request of any party to such an action against such defendant, the court shall also review the determination of law made by the Commission in the proceeding under subsection (b) that the act or practice which was the subject of such proceeding constituted an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of subsection (a). (3) The Commission may compromise or settle any action for a civil penalty if such compromise or settlement is accompanied by a public statement of its reasons and is approved by the court. (n) Standard of proof; public policy considerations The Commission shall have no authority under this section or section 57a of this title to declare unlawful an act or practice on the grounds that such act or practice is unfair unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. In determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the Commission may consider established public policies as evidence to be considered with all other evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve as a primary basis for such determination. (Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, §5, 38 Stat. 719 ; Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, §3, 52 Stat. 111 ; June 23, 1938, ch. 601, title XI, §1107(f), 52 Stat. 1028 ; June 25, 1948, ch. 646, §32(a), 62 Stat. 991 ; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §127, 63 Stat. 107 ; Mar. 16, 1950, ch. 61, §4(c), 64 Stat. 21 ; July 14, 1952, ch. 745, §2, 66 Stat. 632 ; Pub. L. 85–726, title XIV, §§1401(b), 1411, Aug. 23, 1958, 72 Stat. 806 , 809; Pub. L. 85–791, §3, Aug. 28, 1958, 72 Stat. 942 ; Pub. L. 85–909, §3, Sept. 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 1750 ; Pub. L. 86–507, §1(13), June 11, 1960, 74 Stat. 200 ; Pub. L. 93–153, title IV, §408(c), (d), Nov. 16, 1973, 87 Stat. 591 , 592; Pub. L. 93–637, title II, §§201(a), 204(b), 205(a), Jan. 4, 1975, 88 Stat. 2193 , 2200; Pub. L. 94–145, §3, Dec. 12, 1975, 89 Stat. 801 ; Pub. L. 96–37, §1(a), July 23, 1979, 93 Stat. 95 ; Pub. L. 96–252, §2, May 28, 1980, 94 Stat. 374 ; Pub. L. 97–290, title IV, §403, Oct. 8, 1982, 96 Stat. 1246 ; Pub. L. 98–620, title IV, §402(12), Nov. 8, 1984, 98 Stat. 3358 ; Pub. L. 100–86, title VII, §715(a)(1), Aug. 10, 1987, 101 Stat. 655 ; Pub. L. 103–312, §§4, 6, 9, Aug. 26, 1994, 108 Stat. 1691 , 1692, 1695; Pub. L. 109–455, §§3, 13, Dec. 22, 2006, 120 Stat. 3372 , 3382; Pub. L. 112–203, §1, Dec. 4, 2012, 126 Stat. 1484 .) Amendment of Section For repeal of amendment by section 13 of Pub. L. 109–455, see Termination Date of 2006 Amendment note below.” Source: 15 U.S.C. § 45; https://www.neochart.com/catalog/federal/title_15/section_45/title15_sec45_b96b57465c31/45_unfair_methods_of_competition_unlawful_prevention_by_comm_0001/index.html; data via neochart.com, snapshot 2026-08.
Pin the synthetic asset and data record
A synthetic combined packet records brand assets, uses, dates, goods and services, channels, consumers, registrations and refusals, competing marks, confusion evidence, surveys and limitations, plus secret information, value evidence, repositories, access, NDAs, training, encryption, disclosures, departures, downloads, acquisition method, independent-development and reverse-engineering records.
Work the source-bound application
The word and logo enter source-identification and distinctiveness analysis; the product shape first encounters functionality. Similarity alone does not decide confusion, so the record preserves goods, channels, purchasers, care and source evidence without weights. The manufacturing parameters enter trade-secret screening only after value-from-secrecy and reasonable-measures evidence. The download is an event, not a misappropriation finding; authorization and acquisition method remain disputed.
Read the populated audit record
The mark-and-secret record contains mark, logo, trade dress, feature, source use, first use, goods, service, channel, consumer, territory, priority, distinctiveness, acquired distinctiveness, functionality, application, specimen, registration, refusal, maintenance, competing mark, similarity, confusion factor, survey, disclaimer, fair use, secret information, economic value, ascertainability, secrecy measure, access, NDA, disclosure, download, authorization, acquisition method, independent development, reverse engineering, remedy field, and reviewer. The artifact contains 17 populated rows.
Jurisdiction: US; as of 2026-08-28; not legal advice; Render structure, refuse interpretation, cite, abstain, and hand off.
RENDER STRUCTURE · REFUSE INTERPRETATION · CITE · ABSTAIN · HAND-OFF: render structure, refuse interpretation, cite provenance, abstain when unsupported, and hand off to human review.
Read the complete record
The complete record keeps sources, stated facts, and questions for review separate. Pinned authorities: Verbatim statute or bounded case excerpt. 15 U.S.C. § 1052: Principal-register limits: The provision pins registration eligibility and refusal categories, including confusion, descriptiveness, functionality and acquired-distinctiveness branches.. 15 U.S.C. § 1125: False designation and dilution: The provision pins use in commerce, likely confusion, false or misleading descriptions, advertising injury and dilution branches.. 15 U.S.C. § 45: Unfair-practice coordinate: FTC Act text supplies a separate unfair or deceptive practice framework that does not replace trademark or trade-secret elements.. Synthetic asset and data record: Classroom facts, not ownership or compliance conclusions. Brand: Company uses word mark, logo, product shape, color, domain and slogan with first-use dates, channels, goods and geographic records. Comparison: Later entrant uses similar name and packaging for adjacent service; record includes consumers, channels, actual-confusion reports, survey and intent evidence. Secret: Company maintains manufacturing parameters and customer pricing in repository with access roles, NDA, training, encryption, exit process and alleged download. Legal and technical trace: Regime, scope, elements, limits, provenance, safeguards and handoff. Trademark function: Identify source, distinguish goods or services, use in commerce, priority, territory, ownership, assignment with goodwill and licensing quality control. Distinctiveness: Generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary or fanciful doctrine, acquired distinctiveness, secondary meaning, trade dress and functionality. Registration: Application, drawing, specimen, goods or services, basis, examination, section One-Zero-Five-Two refusal, opposition, registration, maintenance and cancellation. Confusion: Mark similarity, goods or services, channels, purchasers, care, strength, actual confusion, intent and other circuit-specific factors; no factor score. Other trademark claims: False designation, false advertising, dilution, nominative or descriptive fair use, parody, abandonment and territorial limits. Trade secret: Information, independent actual or potential economic value from not generally known or readily ascertainable, reasonable measures, ownership and secrecy duration. Misappropriation: Improper acquisition, disclosure or use, knowledge, lawful reverse engineering, independent development, employee mobility, inevitable-disclosure variant and remedy.
Narrow summary
Protect source-identifying marks through use and confusion analysis, protect secrets through value and reasonable measures, and return evidence traces rather than regime conclusions.